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relies on federal deposit insurance which itself
requires a credible supranational fiscal
backstop. And without the democratic
accountability provided by political union, no
new integrated policy framework can be
sustainable.
• Europe must also overcome its tendency to
jump to permanent solutions, and acknowledge
the need for pragmatic short-term actions that
are tailored to the urgency of the crisis. Euro-
peans have repeatedly tried to resolve long-
term issues before deciding on short-term
fixes, but that strategy is a luxury they no
longer have. Specifically regarding banking
issues, a proper crisis management and reso-
lution system must be put in place before all
longer-term institutional questions are
answered.
• Thus, leaders should establish a temporary
euro area bank resolution authority, as none of
the existing institutions has the skills and man-
date that would allow it to perform the thank-
less task of identifying and restructuring failing
financial institutions. A successful bank crisis
resolution process will require temporary guar-
antees, including temporary central reinsur-
ance of national deposit insurance systems by
the soon-to-be-created European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) or by a more robust future
central financial instrument. 
• In the longer term, the euro area needs not only
a single supervisory mechanism for banks but
also a regionally based deposit insurance
system and a central resolution authority for
failing banks. The ECB can play a large role in
this future framework but cannot be its only
component. National bank supervisors will
retain many of their attributes but their gover-
nance will need to change. Ultimately the bank-
ing union should cover all banks in the euro
THE EURO AREA HAS MANY PROBLEMS but the
core of the current crisis, what makes it unique, is
Europe’s insufficient ability to make authoritative
policy and political decisions for the region as a
whole. To correct this weakness, Europe must
build a fourfold union that would allow such exec-
utive decisions to be made. The four components
are: (1) a banking union, (2) a fiscal union, (3) a
competitiveness union, and (4) a political union,
ie institutional reform to embed democratic
accountability more solidly in decision-making. 
The key issues for the euro area in this respect are:
• The deterioration of credit conditions in the
euro area stems less from inadequate deci-
sions than from an absence of decisions when
they were needed. This 'executive deficit' is
partly a consequence of the European institu-
tions’ lack of democratic accountability, often
referred to as democratic deficit. It also con-
tributes to a loss of European citizens’ trust in
those same institutions. The European Central
Bank (ECB) is a partial exception to this prob-
lem but cannot make up for the lack of deci-
siveness of the other institutions.
• Accordingly, profound changes must be made
to Europe’s institutional framework to make it
effective in resolving the current crisis and
preventing future crises. An authoritative
European-level executive framework must
oversee banking, fiscal and structural policies.
This executive framework must be made
accountable to Europe’s citizens, and for this
the European Parliament must become more
representative and exert better control over
policymaking. Those four components of
banking, fiscal, competitiveness and political
union will take several years to be completed.
They are mutually interdependent and must be
taken together, ideally in parallel increments.
In particular, the completion of a banking union
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area and possibly in other European Union
member states, even though it seems likely
that exceptions will be initially negotiated by
member states to exclude some smaller banks
from its oversight.
A breakup of the euro area would be disastrous for
Europeans and to a large extent for the global
economy. The choices facing Europe’s leaders and
citizens are daunting. Their slow pace of decision-
making has exacted a heavy price from Europe’s
economies, societies, and families. Greece
remains a burning concern. No one can be assured
that the euro area would survive its disorderly exit;
but there is still no clear enforcement framework
available if its adjustment trajectory keeps veer-
ing off track, as it has repeatedly over the last two
years. Investors have good reasons to be nervous. 
Yet it is not too late for Europeans to take action to
ensure the survival, sustainability and success of
monetary and economic union.
The remainder of this Policy Contribution expands
on these points and provides additional analysis. 
EUROPE’S EXECUTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
Europe’s systemic financial crisis has been going
on for five years. Its start can be dated back to
German top banking supervisor Jochen Sanio’s
reported warning on 29 July 2007 of “the worst
banking crisis since 1931” while discussing the
public bail-out of a medium-sized lender, IKB1.
Since then, European banking policymakers have
been in continuous crisis management mode but
have never been able to bring the interbank
market back to its normal state without excep-
tional government guarantees. As is well known,
from late 2009 the banking fragility was com-
pounded in the euro area by the growing unwill-
ingness of market investors to lend to sovereigns,
first Greece and later others, creating a mutually
reinforcing 'doom loop' between weak sovereigns
and banking credit conditions.
1. Financial Times,
‘Germany rescues subprime
lender’, 2 August 2007.
2. This informal group
included, in alphabetical
order: European
Commission President José
Manuel Barroso; European
Central Bank President
Mario Draghi; Eurogroup
Chairman Jean-Claude
Juncker; International
Monetary Fund Managing
Director Christine Lagarde;
German Chancellor Angela
Merkel; European
Commissioner Olli Rehn;
French President Nicolas
Sarkozy; and European
Council President Herman
Van Rompuy. See for
example Peter Spiegel, ‘EU
presses Rome and Athens’,
Financial Times, 14
November 2011.
3. Finance ministers of
Finland, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands held joint
meetings in the context of
the Greek debt restructuring
negotiations. See for
example Associated Press,
‘Greek debt talks to stretch
into weekend’, 3 February
2012.
4. See for example Nicolas
Véron, ‘Banking federalism
is key to the Eurozone’s
survival’, Emerging Markets
G20 Edition, 3 November
2011.
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‘EU institutions have been criticised for their democratic deficit; the crisis has revealed an
equally gaping executive deficit. The lack of legitimacy contributes to the paralysis of executive
decision-making; and Europe’s inability to solve its problems deepens citizens’ distrust.’
Half a decade is a long time in policymaking. In
retrospect, the lack of proactive decision-making
at the European level is striking. While the
common depiction is of a crisis of the euro-area
periphery, it can equally be described as a failure
of the euro-area centre, by which I mean the
mechanisms and actors that determine executive
policy for the entire euro area as opposed to
individual member states. Prominent among
these are the European Commission, European
Council of EU member states’ heads of state and
government, Economic and finance affairs
(ECOFIN) council of EU member states’ finance
ministers, Eurogroup meeting of euro area
member states’ finance ministers, plus multiple
ad hoc subsets of euro area countries and
institutions, such as French-German and more
recently French-German-Italian or French-German-
Italian-Spanish meetings, the 'Frankfurt Group' in
late 20112, or the four remaining euro area triple-
A-rated countries in early 20123. There have been
occasional misguided decisions, such as an ill-
designed bank recapitalisation plan adopted in
late October 20114. But, on the whole, such policy
errors of commission have been less damaging
than the absence of decisions.
European institutions have long been criticised for
their democratic deficit, and the crisis has
revealed an equally gaping executive deficit.
Moreover, these two feed each other: the lack of
democratic legitimacy contributes to the paraly-
sis of executive decision-making; and Europe’s
inability to solve its collective problems deepens
citizens’ distrust of its institutions. This is another
kind of 'doom loop', political rather than financial,
but no less damaging than the one between sov-
ereign and banking credit. To be fair to the per-
sonalities involved, this failure must be seen as a
systemic problem of inadequate incentives and
institutions, rather than a shortcoming of individ-
ual leadership.
The insufficiently democratic nature of European
decision-making has many aspects. First, Euro-
pean citizens lack equal representation in the
Nicolas Véron THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPE'S FOURFOLD UNION
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5. Press release No.
72/2009 of 30 June 2009,
‘Act Approving the Treaty of
Lisbon compatible with the
Basic Law; accompanying
law unconstitutional to the
extent that legislative
bodies have not been
accorded sufficient rights of
participation’, Federal
Constitutional Court of
Germany.
6. It may be noted that an
early call for a stronger
European executive
policymaking capacity in
the context of the euro area
crisis came from then-
President of the ECB
Jean-Claude Trichet,
‘Building Europe, Building
Institutions’, speech on
receiving the Charlemagne
Prize 2011 in Aachen, 2
June 2011.
European Parliament, a shortcoming cited in June
2009 by Germany’s federal constitutional court as
a key reason for Berlin not to surrender national
fiscal power to Brussels. In addition, the European
Parliament lacks control over financial and other
executive decisions. Consequently, it cannot act
“in such a way that a decision on political direc-
tion taken by the European electorate could have
a politically decisive effect,” and this constitutes a
“structural democratic deficit”5. Second, the Euro-
pean Council, a key actor in Europe’s collective
executive decision-making, does not have a
framework to ensure collective accountability. Its
members, heads of state and/or of government,
are exclusively accountable to their respective
national citizens, but the Council as a whole is
accountable to no one. The same shortcoming
hampers the summit meetings of the euro area,
as well as other intergovernmental formations
such as the ECOFIN Council and Eurogroup. The
European Commission is more strongly account-
able to the European Parliament, but it has often
been sidelined in the past five years (with impor-
tant exceptions such as on competition policy).
Third, when electorates in individual member
states were consulted on successive treaty revi-
sions by referendum, negative responses have
not been answered by a change of orientation. The
French and Dutch rejection of the 2004 constitu-
tional treaty were followed by the reintroduction
of a near-identical text as the Lisbon Treaty in
2007; the Irish were asked to vote again on the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 after first rejecting it in
2008. The democratic shortfall has been widely
cited as a factor in the rise of populist anti-Euro-
pean parties in recent elections in several
member states.
It might sound paradoxical to advocate stronger
democratic accountability as a means to reinforce
Europe’s ability to make executive decisions.
Democratic checks and balances, including par-
liamentary control mechanisms, are constraints
on executive discretion. But the lesson of the past
five years in Europe is that, in a region like Europe
where the commitment to democracy runs deep,
the absence of such checks and balances crip-
plingly inhibits decision-making as leaders do not
feel empowered to take bold action for the region
as a whole. Alternative history is always a perilous
exercise, but it is likely that if proper European
executive decision-making and oversight
processes had existed in the banking, fiscal, and
structural policy areas during the past decade, the
European systemic banking fragility could have
been resolved as early as 2009 (as it was in the
United States); a special resolution regime for all
European banks could have been introduced early
in the crisis, instead of a legislative discussion
about it being started only in June 2012; Greece’s
sovereign debt could have been contained in early
2010; and the growth potential of Europe, espe-
cially of its southern member states, could have
been bolstered. In other words, Europe’s executive
and democratic deficit has mattered hugely for
economic outcomes and the inability to tackle the
crisis, and will continue to do so.
It must be noted that the ECB is an outlier in this
context. Central bankers are inherently less
dependent than other policymakers on demo-
cratic accountability mechanisms to legitimise
their decisions. Therefore, the ECB has been less
paralysed than other actors by the weaknesses of
democratic representation at the European level,
and it has exercised its authority forcefully. But
the ECB must be careful not to act much beyond
the treaty-defined limits of its mandate. Its ability
to fill Europe’s executive deficit is thus limited6. 
THE NEED FOR FOURFOLD UNION
A resolution of the current crisis must address
these mutually reinforcing deficits of executive
decision-making capability and of democratic rep-
resentation and empowerment. The key executive
functions that need strengthening are financial
sector oversight, government financing and struc-
tural reform, which is why there is a need for a
banking union, a fiscal union and a competitive-
ness union. In parallel, a transformed European
institutional framework must provide democratic
accountability, the political backbone of European
integration, and address the concerns expressed
in the above mentioned 2009 ruling of the German
federal constitutional court. This institutional
transformation can be called a political union as it
would entail the recognition of a political space at
the European level and not only in individual
member states. Such a fourfold union is needed
to resolve the euro area crisis over the medium
term. 
THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPE'S FOURFOLD UNION Nicolas Véron
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7. ‘Towards a Genuine Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union’,
Report by President of the
European Council Herman
Van Rompuy, Brussels,
EUCO 120/12.
8. A possible blueprint was
outlined before the last Eu-
ropean Council meeting by
Jean Pisani-Ferry, André
Sapir, Nicolas Véron and
Guntram Wolff, ‘What kind of
European banking union?’
Policy Contribution
2012/12, Bruegel, June
2012.
9. One exploration of the
policy options is in Benedic-
ta Marzinotto, André Sapir
and Guntram Wolff, ‘What
kind of fiscal union?’ Policy
Brief 2011/06, Bruegel, No-
vember 2011.
10. National parliaments
may also play a role in
strengthening democratic
accountability, but cannot
replace the European Parlia-
ment as the only assembly
where all EU citizens are
represented together.
11. Anders Aslund, ‘Why a
Breakup of the Euro Area
Must be Avoided: Lessons
from Previous Breakups’,
Peterson Institute Policy
Brief, August 2012
12. This number will grow to
28 in mid-2013 with the
planned accession of Croat-
ia to the European Union.
These labels, which echo the four 'building blocks'
proposed by the President of the European Coun-
cil in a landmark report published on 26 June7, are
certainly formulaic and can encompass many
possible options. Yet they are used here as a
useful way to discuss the preconditions for crisis
resolution. 
Each component union can be seen as a response
to lost trust in Europe’s collective future – respec-
tively, the evaporation of the interbank market and
especially of cross-border interbank lending
(banking union); the erosion of market demand for
euro area national sovereign debt, which is
increasingly perceived as carrying a credit risk
(fiscal union); the doubts about euro-area coun-
tries’ ability to generate dynamic economic growth
(competitiveness union); and the growing cyni-
cism about the undemocratic nature of European
decision-making (political union).
In practice, a banking union would entail a
common framework for banking supervision,
crisis resolution, and deposit insurance8. A fiscal
union would include the creation of a commonly
issued debt instrument to meet investors’ demand
for a credit-risk-free asset (or 'Eurobonds', but
actually there are many possible designs for such
an instrument), accompanied by adequate cen-
tral controls on national budgetary choices9. A
competitiveness union would monitor, assess and
coordinate structural reform policies at the
national and European levels, including in areas
such as insolvency legislation, financial regula-
tion, service sector regulation and labour law,
which have a major impact on the potential devel-
opment of high-growth firms in Europe. A political
union would make the European Parliament gen-
uinely representative and able to exert due dem-
ocratic control of relevant executive functions10.
All these steps are necessary to sustain the euro
area’s monetary union and to prevent the
dissolution of the euro area, which, as Anders
Aslund at the Peterson Institute among others has
convincingly argued, is likely to be disastrous for
all parties11. A fourfold union would not by itself
resolve the crisis. But it would effectively address
the obstacles that have impeded progress in the
past five years, and thus make crisis resolution a
possibility that is not currently at hand.
Progress towards a fourfold union requires think-
ing about political obstacles, interdependencies
and sequencing. National resistances vary
depending on the component and the country. For
example, banking union and fiscal union tend to
be supported by troubled countries as a way to
share their liabilities with stronger countries. Con-
versely, fiscally stronger member states tend to
emphasise central control over banking, fiscal and
competitiveness decisions as a precondition for
liability sharing. Political union tends to be more
easily envisaged by countries with a strong fed-
eral tradition, such as Belgium, Italy or Germany,
than by those with a more centralized state,
including France. Another impediment to estab-
lishing such a union stems from the fact that the
European Union possesses a supranational legal
and political framework that covers 27 member
states12, but the euro area remains only a subset
of countries.
Six non-euro area member states (Bulgaria, Den-
mark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) are
members of the Euro Plus Pact, a 2011 policy
framework that can be seen as the existing basis
for a competitiveness union. The European Fiscal
Compact, which provides a possible basis for fur-
ther fiscal union, includes all EU member states
except for the Czech Republic and the United King-
dom. All EU member states participate in the
London-based European Banking Authority (EBA)
which would have a role to play in a future banking
union. Most significantly perhaps, the European
Parliament is an EU institution, as is the European
Commission. One can imagine restricted forma-
tions in which only members of the European Par-
liament (MEPs) from euro area countries would
have a right to vote, somewhat akin to the Scot-
tish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland Grand Commit-
tees in the UK House of Commons, with possible
‘A fourfold union would not by itself resolve the crisis. But it would effectively address the
obstacles that have impeded progress in the past five years, and thus make crisis resolution a
possibility that is not currently at hand.’
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observer status for MEPs from non-euro area
countries. For all its importance, the euro area is
embedded in the European Union and cannot
envisage its institutional future independently
from the Union as a whole.
The components of the fourfold union agenda are
mutually interdependent. Because executive
capability must be seen as legitimate, banking,
fiscal or competitiveness union will not be sus-
tainable without political union. Fiscal union is
also necessary for a stable banking union,
because a common deposit insurance system,
even one funded by levies on the financial sector,
must ultimately rely on a common and credible
fiscal backstop. There is also a direct relationship
between banking union and competitiveness
union, as financial-system policy is one of the key
areas in which Europe must introduce structural
reforms to enhance its growth potential. These
observations mean that none of the components
of the fourfold union can be seen as a substitute
for the others.
In terms of sequencing, progress of all four must
occur in lockstep, or at least in parallel. For exam-
ple, an incremental advance on banking union,
such as that achieved at the euro-area countries’
summit on 29 June 2012, requires further incre-
mental steps forward on fiscal union to pave the
way for a common deposit insurance system.
Advances towards political union are needed to
buttress the pooling of sovereignty entailed by a
single supervisory and resolution authority, or by
joint issuance of bonds by all euro-area countries.
European leaders cannot afford to neglect any of
these four components in the difficult steps
ahead.
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM RESPONSES
Europe must pay equal attention to short-term
crisis management and longer-term initiatives to
build a more sustainable system. An exclusive
short-term focus may worsen future problems. But
a focus only on the long term, ignoring the most
urgent challenges, is no less dangerous.
This may sound self-evident, but is worth empha-
sising in the euro-area crisis context. Euro area
leaders have often given the impression of focus-
ing exclusively on long-term legislative and insti-
tutional reforms while neglecting more short-term
aspects of the crisis. When they did take short-
term action, they often sounded as if the result
was final and there would be no further steps
needed after the one just announced. Yet institu-
tions take time and deliberation to change, while
the crisis has a pace of its own, requiring an imme-
diate policy response. Short-term responses must
be undertaken despite the absence of a specific
legal framework. Pragmatic adaptation is often
required. By contrast, post-crisis reconstruction
can be carried out after time is devoted to higher
standards of consistency and accountability.
Short-term emergency legislation is different from
permanent legislative reform.
From this standpoint, the US and European
responses to the 2008 crisis stand in striking con-
trast. A high point of financial turmoil was reached
in the early autumn of 2008, following the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Broadly speaking, the
financial shock was of similar magnitude on both
sides of the Atlantic, even though the initial appar-
ent trigger had been the subprime crisis in the
United States. In America, the sequence included
a highly visible piece of emergency legislation
(the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,
enacted October 3, 2008), which allowed the
banking situation to be temporarily stabilised in
mid-October through bank recapitalisations using
the so-called Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). The next major step was a comprehensive
programme of capital assessment and recapitali-
sation of the 19 largest banks (the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program, known as 'stress
tests' and conducted from February to May 2009).
Its completion resulted in a rapid return of the
interbank market to normal conditions. Then, in
mid-June 2009, the US government published a
blueprint for long-term financial reform, which
‘Europe must pay equal attention to short-term crisis management and longer-term initiatives to
build a more sustainable system. An exclusive short-term focus may worsen future problems.
But a focus only on the long term, ignoring the most urgent challenges, is no less dangerous.’
THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPE'S FOURFOLD UNION Nicolas Véron
07
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
13. Euro Area Summit State-
ment, Brussels, 29 June
2012
14. In my case, relevant ref-
erences include ‘Is Europe
ready for a major banking
crisis?’ Policy Brief
2007/03, Bruegel, August
2007; ‘A solution for Eu-
rope’s banking problem’,
with Adam Posen, Policy
Brief 2009/03, Bruegel,
June 2009; prepared state-
ment on ‘The European Debt
and Financial Crisis: Origins,
Options and Implications for
the US and Global Econo-
my’, US Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, Subcommittee
on Security and Internation-
al Trade and Finance, hear-
ing on 22 September 2011.
15. See in particular Do-
minique Strauss-Kahn, ‘Cri-
sis Management Arrange-
ments for a European Bank-
ing System’, keynote
speech at the European
Commission conference
Building a Crisis Manage-
ment Framework for the In-
ternal Market, Brussels, 19
March 2010.
16. European Commission
press release IP/12/570,
‘New crisis management
measures to avoid future
bank bail-outs’, 6 June
2012.
17. Christine Lagarde, open-
ing remarks at the IMF/CFP
Policy Roundtable on the fu-
ture of financial regulation,
Washington DC, 17 April
2012, available at
www.imf.org.
18. Mario Draghi, introduc-
tory statement before the
Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs of the
European Parliament, Brus-
sels, 25 April 2012.
opened a phase of legislative deliberation con-
cluding with enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July
2010. The implementation of Dodd-Frank through
rulemaking by various federal agencies then
started and continues, though with some delays.
Several issues remain unresolved, including US
housing market reform, but it appears fair to say
that the United States first adopted short-term
crisis management and resolution measures from
October 2008 to mid-2009, and then followed by
another sequence of long-term reforms.
By contrast, the European Union has persistently
focused on long-term initiatives first, and to con-
cede short-term action only under the irresistible
pressure of events. This tendency results from the
executive deficit described above, and the fact
that long-term actions lend themselves to a pro-
tracted legislative process that EU institutions
favour. To be fair, individual member states have
carried out significant short-term actions, but their
effectiveness has been diminished by the lack of
adequate European-level coordination. For exam-
ple, the summit of heads of state and government
of euro-area members and the UK in Paris on 12
October 2008, initially helped stabilise markets,
along with the near-simultaneous use of TARP in
the United States for bank recapitalisations. But
this initial success was not followed by system-
wide monitoring and capital assessment in
Europe, in spite of successive rounds of stress
tests in 2009, 2010 and 2011, leaving the Euro-
pean banking sector fragile. A more recent case is
the Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012,
which contemplated the direct intervention of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to recapi-
talise banks in certain euro-area countries. It pro-
claimed the aim “to break the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns,” but only “when
an effective single supervisory mechanism is
established”13. Taken literally, this is somewhat
akin to deciding that firefighters can intervene to
put out a fire only after architects and builders
have completed their work of design and recon-
struction of the firehouse.
To be more effective in the next phases of the
crisis, the euro area should adopt more explicit
short-term crisis management contingency meas-
ures, even if they are designed as temporary
steps to be superseded by future permanent
arrangements. This is particularly the case in man-
aging the banking crisis and making progress
towards the creation of a banking union.
BANKING UNION: SHORT-TERM ASPECTS
Several analysts, including myself, have urged
adoption of a federal framework for banking policy
with centralised functions of supervision, crisis
resolution and deposit insurance as essential to
the stability of the European banking system and
to the sustainability of euro-area monetary
union14. Similar views have been advocated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)15. Yet such
analysis has long remained controversial inside
the European Union. As recently as early June
2012, the European Commission proposed draft
legislation on long-term reform of bank crisis man-
agement and resolution that envisaged no central
deposit insurance, supervisory, or resolution
authority16. However, the vision of banking union
as an indispensable component of a sustainable
economic and monetary union gathered remark-
able momentum in the spring of 2012. It was
forcefully advocated by IMF Managing Director
Christine Lagarde in mid-April17, backed by ECB
President Mario Draghi in late April18, promoted by
newly elected French President François Hollande
in late May in what can be seen as a significant
departure from previous French policy19, and more
cautiously yet unambiguously endorsed by
German Chancellor Angela Merkel in early June20. 
This momentum created the context for the previ-
ously mentioned Euro Area Summit Statement of
29 June 2012, which asked the European Com-
mission to present proposals (now expected in
September) for a 'single supervisory mechanism'
to be established under Article 127(6) of the
Treaty, implying an anchoring role for the ECB. The
statement further creates the possibility for the
‘To be more effective in the next phases of the crisis, the euro area should adopt more explicit
short-term crisis management contingency measures, even if they are temporary. This is
particularly the case in managing the banking crisis and moving towards a banking union.’
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19. Transcript of the Presi-
dent of the French Repub-
lic’s press conference in
Brussels, 23 May 2012,
available in French on
http://www.elysee.fr/presi-
dent/les-actualites/confer-
ences-de-presse/2012/con
ference-de-presse-de-m-le-
president-de-
la.13289.html.
20. Reuters, ‘Merkel calls for
body to supervise major EU
banks’, 4 June 2012.
21. For a discussion of this
contrast see Morris Gold-
stein and Nicolas Véron,
‘Too Big to Fail: The Transat-
lantic Debate’, in J.F.
Kirkegaard, N. Véron and
G.B. Wolff (eds), Transat-
lantic Economic Challenges
in an Era of Growing Multi-
polarity, Peterson Insti-
tute/Bruegel Special Report
22 July 2012.
22. Interview with Mario
Draghi in Le Monde, 21 July
2012.
23. Gabriele Steinhauser
and Brian Blackstone,
‘Europe’s Bank Shifts View
on Bond Losses’, Wall Street
Journal, 16 July 2012.
ESM “to recapitalise banks directly. This would rely
on appropriate conditionality [for each relevant
member state], including compliance with state
aid rules, which should be institution-specific,
sector-specific or economy-wide and would be for-
malised in a Memorandum of Understanding
[between European-level authorities and the
member state concerned].” This declaration has
been rightly hailed as a policy breakthrough, but it
also raises far more questions than it answers. As
previously argued, the next steps will require care-
ful thinking about the sequence and articulation
of short-term and long-term initiatives, as well as
about the interdependencies between action on
the banking system and the other components of
Europe’s 'fourfold union'.
In the short term, policymakers need to think in
terms of systemic bank crisis resolution. They
could gain precious insight from consideration of
the lessons from previous episodes of systemic
crises in developed countries, particularly the US
Savings and Loan crisis of the late 1980s, the
Scandinavian crises of the early 1990s, the
Japanese crisis until 2002-03, and the US finan-
cial crisis of 2007-09. The aim is to restore trust in
the banking system, starting with the more sys-
temically important banks. This necessarily
involves willingness to acknowledge and share
losses; a strong and well-empowered resolution
authority; significant financial risk-taking by public
authorities; and several phases, from the emer-
gency prevention of contagion to the restoration
of individual banks’ safety and soundness.
The starting point is that there are probably vast
unrecognised losses in Europe’s banking sector
and that the resolution framework must allow an
adequate sharing of these losses among all rele-
vant stakeholders, including private-sector credi-
tors. At the same time, ordinary bankruptcy
procedures are notoriously unsuitable for sys-
temically important financial institutions. Some
European member states, including some but not
all in the euro area, have adopted special resolu-
tion regimes for banks. But so far, almost no senior
unsecured creditors have been forced to take
losses on financial institutions found insolvent in
the European Union. Leaving aside a handful of
tiny bank bankruptcies in northern Europe, the
only exceptions have been two medium-sized
banks in Denmark (Amargebanken in February
2011, and Fjordbank Mors in June 2011) but
under a policy framework that was later amended
so that subsequent situations would be treated
differently. In most cases, even subordinated
unsecured creditors of failed banks have been
fully repaid, at great cost to the respective coun-
tries’ taxpayers. This stands in stark contrast to
the US, where a handful of high-profile federal
bailouts (most notably Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac and AIG) have rightly caused much
public controversy, but senior unsecured creditors
have been forced to take major losses on their
exposures to dozens of depositary institutions,
including large ones such as Washington Mutual,
and medium-sized non-banks such as CIT and MF
Global, not to mention Lehman Brothers21.
The European practice of fully bailing out all senior
creditors, even of smaller banks, and many junior
ones is clearly unsustainable. The aim to have
adequate participation of senior creditors in the
sharing of losses should become the driving
objective of Europe’s crisis management and res-
olution approach. The ECB has recently signaled
its acknowledgement of this reality, in a significant
shift from its earlier policy positions22. However,
most member states and the European Commis-
sion, ostensibly motivated by contagion concerns,
still appear to defend the view that no losses
should be imposed on any senior creditors even
of failed banks23.
The best way to address the fear of contagion is to
conduct the assessment of bank solvency on a
system-wide basis, ie by including all systemi-
cally important banks throughout the euro area in
a comprehensive, rigorous and consistent review
of balance sheets and capital strength. This was
the key to past successful systemic crisis resolu-
tions, including in Sweden in 1992-93, in Japan
(belatedly) in 2002-03, and in the US with the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program in 2009.
Conversely, the fact that in the euro area, capital
assessment and restructuring has been left to
national authorities in spite of the high degree of
cross-border market integration is a major reason
why Europe’s banking fragility remains unresolved
after half a decade of turmoil, three rounds of
stress tests (2009, 2010, 2011), and the ill-fated
'recapitalisation plan' of October 2011. There is
THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPE'S FOURFOLD UNION Nicolas Véron
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considerable political resistance against a gen-
uine system-wide approach to banks’ capital
assessment, particularly in countries such as
France and Germany whose official positions are
that their respective banking systems have been
kept sound (notwithstanding past problems at
banks such as IKB, Hypo Real Estate, WestLB and
Dexia). But it might be the only possible approach
that allows significant burden-sharing with senior
creditors, an increasingly evident financial and
political imperative, not to mention the moral
hazard implications of open-ended taxpayer-sup-
ported bailouts.
Even if it remains impossible to approach resolu-
tion synchronously across the euro area, it is a
clear lesson of the past few years that the resolu-
tion authority must be centralised. The most evi-
dent reason is that national authorities have failed
on their supervisory duties in several member
states, and have lost too much credibility to
remain the main decision-maker on future restruc-
turing, as in the case of Spain. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to see how to build a perception of fairness in
the treatment of controversial situations across
several countries without having a single authority
in charge for the entire euro area (or possibly
beyond, assuming other member states would
want to participate). Furthermore, bank resolution
is an extremely time-consuming, skill-intensive
and sensitive process that cannot possibly be
coordinated across borders without an unam-
biguous centralisation of information and author-
ity. Many of Europe’s larger banks have significant
cross-border operations within the European
Union, and a centralised resolution process is the
only practical way to balance the interests of
home and host countries, as national authorities
have powerful incentives not to cooperate in such
cases. In addition, as some banking operations
and assets are likely to be brought under tempo-
rary public ownership as a result of the resolution
process, centralisation of their management
and/or disposal would prevent ineffective compe-
tition among different national authorities to the
collective detriment of taxpayers, and would help
an orderly process of price discovery as assets are
eventually sold back to the private sector. Finally,
it makes operational sense to have expertise and
skills concentrated in one central team rather than
having it spread thinly across various member
states, both in terms of cost-effectiveness and
more importantly of ability to attract talent and
learn from experience.
No existing institution is well equipped to assume
this role of euro-area resolution authority. The ECB,
in addition to not having the relevant skills directly
at hand, cannot assume the politically con-
tentious responsibility of bank resolution in a
manner compatible with its jealously safeguarded
monetary policy independence. The European
Banking Authority, in addition to not having the rel-
evant skills directly at hand either, is ruled out
given its governance structure that makes it too
dependent on member states and by its location
in the UK, a country that has unambiguously
refused to participate in any effort towards bank-
ing union. The European Financial Stability Facil-
ity (EFSF) and soon-to-be-established ESM are
small structures with no expert banking special-
ist staff, and even more than in the case of the EBA
may lack the independence from member states
to ensure the impartiality of the resolution
process. The European Commission has built valu-
able experience through the implication of its
directorate-general for competition (DG COMP) in
most bank restructurings over the past years
under the European Union’s state aid control
policy, and its involvement in the 'troika' that nego-
tiates conditionality with countries under assis-
tance programmes, including in the recent case of
Spain. But it is questionable whether the task of
restructuring may conflict with the Commission’s
many institutional constraints, and whether its
staffing by general-purpose civil servants is com-
patible with the need for specialised skills in the
resolution and restructuring tasks.
This suggests that in the short term the best way
to achieve a resolution authority at the euro-area
level might be to create a temporary, dedicated
structure with wide latitude to recruit specialised
staff, both from the private sector and through sec-
ondment from national or European public author-
ities. In addition, bank restructuring and resolution
is a thankless task, and those who will perform it
will gain few friends, an observation which also
favours a temporary structure that can ensure
maximum independence and impartiality. There
are precedents that suggest that this can be an
effective approach to systemic crisis resolution,
Nicolas Véron THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPE'S FOURFOLD UNION
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including the US Resolution Trust Corporation
(1989-95), the Swedish Bank Support Authority
(1993-96), or, in the case of systemic issues
beyond the financial system, the Treuhandanstalt
that restructured and sold the former German
Democratic Republic’s state-owned enterprises in
1990-94, or the US Presidential Task Force on the
Auto Industry that coordinated government policy
on Chrysler and GM in 2009. While none of these
experiences passed completely smoothly, they
all suggest that a temporary, well-empowered task
force structure, obviously with adequate provi-
sions for accountability and transparency, would
represent a credible and well-suited response to
the short-term challenge of European bank crisis
resolution.
This leaves open the question of future ownership
of those institutions that the temporary resolution
authority would find insolvent following in-depth
balance sheet assessment. In legal terms, those
countries that do not currently have a special res-
olution regime for banks should pass emergency
legislation to create one, and those that have one
might also need emergency legislation to
empower the temporary resolution authority at
the euro-area level. Failed banks will generally
need to be taken over by public authorities, but
there might be no uniform framework by which
public authorities will become equity owners. One
can imagine a combination of national govern-
ment ownership and ownership at the European
level (specifically by the ESM as suggested by the
euro area summit statement of June 29), depend-
ing on countries and individual bank situations.
This should logically be negotiated by the tempo-
rary resolution authority together with the impo-
sition of losses on relevant categories of creditors
(excluding, of course, those which are covered by
explicit guarantees). While these negotiations
should be conducted with a sense of impartiality
and evenhandedness across the euro area, dif-
ferences in legal environments, banking struc-
tures and fiscal positions make it unadvisable,
and arguably impossible, to adopt a one-size-fits-
all approach.
Beyond this, crisis resolution and restructuring
will necessarily involve significant financial risk-
taking by public authorities – but these have to be
compared to the current open-ended explicit and
implicit commitments of support to the financial
sector that exist at the level of individual member
states. Here again, banking policy cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from the other components of
fourfold union.
This is most obvious as regards the protection of
retail deposits, and more generally the prevention
of further capital flight, particularly in the more
fragile countries. As previously argued, European
policymakers should refrain from a blanket and
permanent guarantee of all bank liabilities, but
they could and should do more to reassure depos-
itors. Deposit data in Europe tends to be only dis-
closed with a lag, and is far from complete, but the
available evidence suggests that deposit flight is
occurring, at varying pace, in several euro-area
countries. This is very dangerous for financial sta-
bility and should be addressed decisively. It would
be irresponsible for policymakers to delay taking
action until it is forced on them by a fully-fledged
retail bank run.
Three main factors appear to motivate deposit
flight: a fear of currency redenomination and
devaluation in case of euro area exit; a fear of
inability of the government to fulfill its deposit
insurance commitments; and for larger depositors,
concerns about their deposits above the insured
threshold in case of failure of the bank in which
they are held. Addressing the first concern
involves reassuring euro-area citizens that there
will be no forced or disorderly exit from the cur-
rency union: the crucial case here, in the next few
months as in the recent past, is obviously Greece,
and to say the least, euro-area leaders have not
done enough to remove uncertainties about its
future status. To address the second concern, the
ESM, when it is in place, should provide a tempo-
rary and unconditional guarantee of national
deposit insurance systems across the euro area,
at least until progress has been made towards
comprehensive bank crisis resolution and possi-
bly until a federal euro-area deposit insurance
system is in place. Such 'deposit reinsurance'
should be temporary because it creates ques-
tionable incentives for member states, but might
be a necessary step to achieve the euro-area lead-
ers’ “imperative to break the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns”. The third concern
could be addressed by targeted temporary guar-
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antees until the completion of a credible, system-
wide process of bank assessment as previously
described.
Finally on the sequencing, several successive
steps will be needed and policymakers should
preserve as much flexibility as possible in their
intervention framework. Even under the most opti-
mistic assumptions, it would take at least 2-3
months to build a temporary European resolution
authority; 3-4 more months to reach a compre-
hensive system-wide assessment of the balance
sheet and capital positions of the most important
banks (which would represent a sample compa-
rable to that of the 2011 stress tests, say between
60 and 90 banks); and one or two additional
months to negotiate the outline of restructuring
packages for those banks found insolvent, which
might number in the double rather than single
digits. As a consequence, the disclosure of capital
assessments, which can only be made once ade-
quate backstop plans have been defined for failed
institutions, could hardly happen before February
or March 2013, and possibly not before the late
spring of 2013 at the earliest, with a long period of
prolonged uncertainty in the meantime. Even after
that, it will take many months if not years to com-
plete the restructurings. As illustrated by multiple
recent cases including WestLB, Fortis, Dexia, RBS
and others, resolving or restructuring problem
banks in Europe is almost always a protracted and
legal-risk-ridden process. This long sequence will
be difficult to manage, and will require very care-
ful and professional communication towards the
financial community and the wider public. 
BANKING UNION: LONGER-TERM ASPECTS
In accordance with the 29 June 2012 euro-area
summit statement, euro-area policymakers have
started discussing the long-term design of their
future banking union even before having set the
key parameters of short-term crisis management
and resolution. In this context, essential choices
will have to be made shortly about the future insti-
tutional framework. The only indication so far is an
anchoring role to be played by the ECB, consistent
with the statement’s reference to article 127(6) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, which states that “The Council, acting by
means of regulations in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after
consulting the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the
European Central Bank concerning policies relat-
ing to the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions and other financial institutions with the
exception of insurance undertakings.”
A proper banking policy framework includes sev-
eral dimensions, including regulation, supervision,
resolution, deposit insurance, competition and
consumer protection. In the European Union, reg-
ulation is mostly defined at the EU level, through
legislation (directives and regulations) and bind-
ing technical rules which are increasingly pre-
pared by the EBA and other European Supervisory
Authorities, even though the European Commis-
sion retains decision-making authority in the cur-
rent framework24. While this framework is
somewhat clumsy, its reform is not a necessary
condition for the establishment of a banking
union. Competition policy is conducted under a
time-tested integrated policy framework, in which
the European Commission’s DG COMP plays a piv-
otal role together with national competition
authorities. Consumer protection might require
further convergence, including as part of a future
economic competitiveness union, even though
this has not yet been considered an urgent con-
cern by most European policymakers. This leaves
supervision, resolution and deposit insurance as
the key areas for which leaders need to start
designing a viable future framework now.
As previously observed, the inherent political
nature of bank resolution authority makes it
unlikely that such authority could be temporarily
or permanently granted to the ECB, even assuming
a separation of teams and a dedicated governance
framework within the institution. This is especially
true in the European context of a weak central
‘The inherent political nature of bank resolution authority makes it unlikely that such authority
could be temporarily or permanently granted to the European Central Bank, even assuming a
separation of teams and a dedicated governance framework within the institution.’
24.  here are however multi-
ple exceptions to the princi-
ple of a ‘single European
rulebook’ for banking regu-
lation, as illustrated among
others by the UK debate
over implementation of the
recommendations of the
Independent Commission
on Banking, or Vickers Com-
mission. Moreover, corpo-
rate law applicable to banks
remains exclusively
national, a situation which
may require modification
with the creation of a per-
manent European resolu-
tion authority. Banks across
the EU will also need to con-
tinue to adapt to different
national tax systems for the
foreseeable future. 
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executive and problematic democratic accounta-
bility, which advises against delegating excessive
discretionary power to the ECB. The ECB itself has
signaled that it had no appetite to assume the
inherently controversial task of bank resolution,
including by stressing that the future banking
union framework should allow the ECB to act “with-
out risks to its reputation”25. Thus, it appears
inevitable that the long-term framework will
include a European resolution authority separate
from the ECB, and also most likely separate from
all other currently existing institutions for the rea-
sons developed in the previous section. However,
it is desirable that the resolution authority should
be able to have close interaction with the ECB, par-
ticularly in times of crisis. For this reason it should
preferably be located in Frankfurt, as geographi-
cal proximity would help in this respect even as
the two institutions would remain separate.
The supervisory function has synergies both with
the lender-of-last-resort role of the ECB, and with
resolution authority. If the June 29 decision is to
be implemented, the ECB will develop supervisory
functions of its own in any case. It is likely that the
resolution authority will require a supervisory
mandate as well, as is the case with the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United
States26; as in the US, it could be coupled with the
deposit insurance function, even though a for-
mally separate deposit insurance fund could be
envisaged as well. Some overlapping of supervi-
sory functions across two or more European insti-
tutions should of course be kept to a minimum to
avoid duplication of some costs and complexity,
but its existence should not necessarily be seen
as a problem in itself: situations of overlap exist in
several jurisdictions including the United States
(Federal Reserve/FDIC/Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency) but also Japan (Bank of
Japan/Financial Services Agency) and Germany
(Bundesbank/BAFin). If the euro area is to avoid
such overlap, its leaders may need to envisage a
change from the 29 June decision and a buildup of
the supervisory function entirely outside of the
ECB even though adequate operational links with
the central bank should be established, as is the
case in Australia, Canada, China, Sweden and
Switzerland among others.
National supervisors would continue to exist in a
future banking union, at least in a first phase. The
European principle of subsidiarity, according to
which a European authority should perform only
those tasks which cannot be performed effec-
tively at the national level, suggests in particular
that the supervision of most local banks should
remain in their scope, and they could be delegated
other tasks by the European supervisor(s). How-
ever, their mandate and governance will need to
be adapted to the new, more integrated approach.
To be consistent with the euro area’s claimed
“imperative to break the vicious circle between
banks and sovereigns,” at least some of their func-
tions should be placed under the authority of the
European supervisor(s) rather than of the respec-
tive national government as is currently the case,
with possible corresponding changes in terms of
their accountability framework. Conversely, one
can imagine a role for national supervisors in the
governance of the new European-level authorities,
including possibly of the new supervisory func-
tion within the ECB, a possibility made arguably
easier by the fact that many of these supervisors
are part of the National Central Banks that partici-
pate in the Eurosystem together with the ECB
itself. However, appropriate lessons should be
drawn from the experience of the EBA and other
European Supervisory Authorities, suggesting that
such role should not be exclusive. Officials with a
European as opposed to national mandate and
accountability, as is the case of members of the
ECB’s executive board, should be prominent in the
key decision-making bodies, unlike the situation
of the EBA where the so-called supervisory board,
which in spite of its name is in charge of most key
executive decisions, is composed exclusively of
national representatives. In line with previous
arguments about political union, strong channels
of accountability should be built vis-à-vis the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
In relation to the above arguments about the role
of national supervisory authorities, the European
supervisory, resolution and deposit insurance
authorities should have competence not only over
those financial institutions that are systemically
important at the European level (or E-SIFIs, to
mimic the current jargon of the Financial Stability
Board and Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, which identifies G-SIFIs as financial
institutions that are systemically important at the
25. Jörg Asmussen,
‘Building deeper economic
union: what to do and what
to avoid’, speech at the
European Policy Centre,
Brussels, 17 July 2012
26. The FDIC is the primary
supervisor of only a subset
of depositary financial
institutions in the US, but
has backup supervisory
authority over all others and
is a prominent member of
the US supervisory
community. 
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This brief and incomplete enumeration shows that
many different parameters remain to be dis-
cussed in order to put in place a consistent per-
manent institutional framework for the future
banking union. In this context, it is to be hoped
that pragmatism will prevail and that direct finan-
cial intervention by the ESM in individual banks
will be unlocked before all these parameters are
set, in order to allow swift and effective crisis man-
agement and resolution. However, it is also desir-
able that euro-area leaders achieve consistency
between their short-term and long-term planning,
and that an early version of a future European
supervisor can be set up rapidly and provide con-
tinuity of approach beyond the short-term phase
and beyond the possible lifetime of a temporary
resolution authority, if such an option is indeed
chosen. 
OUTLOOK
Even under optimistic assumptions, the situation
in the euro area will remain affected by high levels
of market volatility. Many observers and investors
have gradually lost hope in the euro area’s ability
to resolve its problems. They are not encouraged
by what they perceive as a state of denial affect-
ing several senior European policymakers, about
both the severity of the region’s problems and the
need to maintain or regain investors’ trust to
resolve them. In their narrative, the euro area is
too diverse to survive as a monetary union, and
centrifugal forces are too strong to be contained.
I share the view that Europe’s current institutions
are not strong enough to contain such forces
indefinitely, but the European Union is and
remains a work in progress and is capable of
change. The completion of a fourfold union would
create a much more robust and resilient frame-
work that could enable decisions to repair
investors’ trust and keep centrifugal forces in
check. Arguments that Europe is too diverse for
stronger central institutions to exist do not hold up
to scrutiny. India is one example of a fairly stable
democratic polity whose internal historical, social,
‘The European Union is and remains a work in progress and is capable of change. The
completion of a fourfold union would create a much more robust and resilient framework that
could enable decisions to repair investors’ trust and keep centrifugal forces in check.’
global level, and D-SIFIs as those that are
systemically important at the domestic level). It
should also cover smaller banks, even though
most operational duties related to these could and
should be devolved to national supervisors. This
would also help maintain, or rather establish, a
competitive level playing field across the banking
union. It is likely however that some member
states will try, at least in a first phase, to negotiate
exceptions for sections of their respective banking
systems with particularly strong links with local
and regional environments. Such exceptions from
the general framework of banking union, which
would also encompass separate deposit
insurance systems, appear unadvisable from the
standpoint of policy consistency and
effectiveness, but may be inevitable to reach a
political consensus at least in an initial phase.
They may concern the German Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe, with the possible exception of the
Landesbanken within it, and perhaps also
Germany’s cooperative bank system (Volksbanks
and Raiffeisenbanks, and DZ-Bank). Whether other
exceptions will be sought by member states other
than Germany remains to be seen.
In terms of geographical scope, the generally
adopted working assumption is that the banking
union would be identical in perimeter to the euro
area. However, it can also be envisaged that its
perimeter would be wider and include some EU
member states that may not join the euro area in
the short term, say Poland or Denmark. This would
create additional complexity and potential risks,
but it is technically conceivable and may be ulti-
mately determined by political considerations.
Under this scenario, common supervisory and res-
olution authorities might span different currency
areas (the euro area being by far the largest) and
be linked to different deposit insurance funds, as
it appears difficult to envisage how a single
deposit insurance fund could span multiple cur-
rency areas. The opposite option, of a banking
union that would include some euro-area coun-
tries but not all, is harder to imagine.
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economic, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity
is greater than in the European Union, let alone the
euro area. Among more advanced economies,
Canada and Switzerland are other examples of
stable, yet diverse and multilingual democracies.
Many pessimistic observers underestimate the
extent to which well-designed political institutions
can tie different communities, provided there is a
desire to hold together.
European integration has been a process of polit-
ical innovation from the start. There is no prece-
dent, and still no equivalent elsewhere in the
world, for the kind of supranational institution-
building that has been going on in Europe since
1950. Even though parallels might be drawn with
some cases of constitution of federations, partic-
ularly the United States in the 1780s and Canada
in the 1860s, these cases are too different from
Europe to have any predictive relevance. As with
all innovation, success can neither be taken as
given nor considered impossible.
In the specific case of the euro area, powerful 'de
facto solidarities' exist and make the bloc more
resilient than superficial observation might sug-
gest. These solidarities are of a different nature
from those involved in earlier steps of European
integration, and are often ill-understood including
in the European economic policy and research
community itself, as the noisy debate about so-
called Target2 imbalances among Eurosystem
central banks, among others, has illustrated27.
They are particularly strong in the case of Ger-
many, the euro area’s pivotal member state.
Nonetheless, Greece remains the litmus test of
whether the euro area will hold together, and the
outcome there is hard to predict. Euro-area lead-
ers, including Greece's, might come to the conclu-
sion that further transfer of economic sovereignty
by Greece to the euro-area level is the only way to
prevent a disorderly dislocation. If this happens,
the issue of European institutions’ democratic
accountability, in other terms the political union
agenda, will gain even more urgency than is cur-
rently the case. Similarly, if a legal impasse is
reached as the consequence of future rulings of
Germany’s constitutional court about crisis man-
agement initiatives, a major strengthening of the
democratic underpinnings of EU institutions might
be the only way to overcome the court’s reserva-
tions against more transfer of decision-making
towards the supranational level.
There is no easy, simple or painless way to resolve
the euro-area crisis successfully. An enormous
effort of adjustment and transformation lies
ahead, in addition to the substantial sacrifices
already incurred by Europe’s member states and
citizens. Achieving a fourfold union as described
here is indispensable to avoid a disorderly and
disastrous euro-area breakup. Time and stamina
will be needed. The changes involved are signifi-
cant, but not impossible. The European Union does
not have to become a 'superstate' to overcome the
crisis, and will remain a hybrid in which compo-
nent nation-states play an irreducible role. The
fragmentation of Europe’s financial, economic and
social space that has occurred since the crisis
started is damaging and worrying, but has not
reached a point of no-return beyond which it could
not be reversed. The euro area faces daunting
challenges, but is far from condemned to failure.
27. See for example
Isabelle Kaminska, ‘*That*
Target2 presentation’, FT
Alphaville, 27 June 2012. 
